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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past twenty-eight years, a police officer, following a lawful arrest, was allowed to search the passenger compartment of an automobile as
incident to that lawful arrest.' Searching an automobile compartment incident to an arrest stood as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches. 2 This was known as a bright-line rule and
was the general teaching and practice among law enforcement agencies

I.
2.

See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Id. at 457.
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across the country. 3 This bright-line rule for a vehicle search incident to a
lawful arrest was established by the Supreme Court decision New York v.
Belton.4 The major purpose of Belton was to avoid the confusion of sophisticated rules for officers, who, as compared to lawyers and judges, are at a
disadvantage for interpreting and applying rules in the field.
The two rationales for having a search incident to a lawful arrest6
(SILA) were established by the Supreme Court in Chimel v. California.
The two rationales were (1) to search the reachable area of the arrestee for
the protection of the officer's safety, and (2) for the preservation of evidence from destruction.7 There have been several problems applying these
two rationales for a SILA in the vehicle context that have left lower courts
with differing opinions. 8 First, lower courts had trouble determining what
was reachable in the automobile context. 9 Second, lower courts had trouble
determining whether a SILA was valid if the arrestee was a vehicle occupant or a recent occupant.1 ° Belton's rule was intended to solve the first
problem of determining what is "reachable" by developing a bright-line rule
for all automobiles, holding that the passenger compartment of all vehicles
is within the reaching distance of an arrestee. 1 The Supreme Court decision
in Thornton v. United States 2 was intended to solve the second problem by
3. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 n.14 (1983) ("[T]he 'bright line'
that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search whenever officers effect a custodial
arrest.").
4.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
5. Id. at 458.
6. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
7. Id. at 763.
8. Several of the problems can be attributed to the fact that Chimel dealt with a
SILA of a person's home while Belton dealt with a SILA of a person's vehicle. See infra
Part 1V.A.
9. The problem relates back to Chimel because the two rationales for a SILA only
apply to the "immediate control" of the arrestee. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. Lower courts had
trouble determining what "immediate control" meant and what is considered reaching distance in application to automobiles. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. The Court in Belton wanted
to solve this confusion of determining what is reachable by giving a bright-line rule for all
automobiles regardless of case-by-case differences. See infra Part II.B. For example, this
would eliminate the factual scenarios of determining people's arm lengths for reaching capability or determining the length of the driver's seat to the passenger compartments to
establish whether there was a possibility something was within reaching distance.
10.
Determining if the occupant had to be a vehicle occupant or recent occupant
produced two questions that plagued lower courts in determining what constituted a valid
S1LA. See infra Part II.C. The first question was whether the occupant had to be inside the
vehicle during the arrest. If it did not matter, then there would be a valid SILA if the occupant was arrested outside his vehicle. See infra Part II.C. The second question was about the
validity of a SILA when the arrestee was removed from his vehicle, handcuffed, and placed
in a squad car because the arrestee can be considered a recent occupant. See infra Part III.A.
11.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
12.
541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004).
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holding that an arrestee can be an occupant or recent occupant for a valid
SILA. 13 The decisions in Belton and Thornton prevailed over the years and
established the rule for a SILA in the automobile context, but many scho-14
lars and justices felt that the SILA cases should be revisited and clarified.
These scholars and justices got their wish.
The recent, and highly significant Supreme Court decision in Arizona
v. Gant,'5 a 5-4 split, changed this twenty-eight-year-old practice of police
officers conducting a SILA by limiting what constitutes a valid SILA. 16 The
Court essentially, but not explicitly, overruled Belton and Thornton's
bright-line rule by holding that the rule effectually eliminated the two principles of a SILA established in Chimel.17 The Court came up with its own
two-part rule for a valid SILA stating, "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." 8 The
Court in Gant was asked to revisit Belton to clarify it, or even overrule its
holding, but the new rule that the Court established fails to do either.' 9 The
new rule misses the mark of clarifying a SILA in the automobile context
because Belton was heading in the right direction based on an implied principle: a vehicle SILA should be different from a non-vehicle SILA.20 Belton
and Thornton established the SILA rule for automobiles by following Chimel, but altered it to fit the differing context of automobiles. 21 The decision
from Gant changes the prevailing practice of how a vehicle SILA is conducted 22 to strictly conform to the decision in Chimel, which dealt with a
13.
Id.at 623-24. The Court wanted to avoid the specific fact determination of when
or why the suspect exited his vehicle before he was confronted by an officer because of the
reasoning for having a bright-line rule as stated in Belton. Id. at 623. The Court held that
"[t]he need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular
moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated." Id. at 622-23.
14.
See infra Part III.A.
15.
129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
16.
Id. at 1719.
17.
Id. The Gant Court did not explicitly overrule Belton and Thornton but instead
limited how both of the decisions were interpreted to adhere to the two rationales of Chimel.
See id.
The Court was somewhat hypocritical because its two-part rule did not follow Chimel
completely. See infra Part III.B.2.
18.
Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723.
19.
Id. at 1719. The new two-part rule is confusing because the Court states that it
conforms to Chimel, but the second part of the rule completely departs from it. See infra Part
III.B.2.
20.
See infra Part W.A.
21.
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620-21 (2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1982).
22.
Belton's bright-line rule was the prevailing practice of how a vehicle SILA was
conducted. See infra Part ll.B.
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SILA of a person's home,23 and furthermore, puts in24place a new rule for a
SILA that departs from the two rationales of Chimel.
This Note will examine the Gant decision, analyze its implications for
future vehicle SILA decisions, and evaluate how the Court in Gant could
have decided this issue differently. Before examining Gant, it is necessary
to thoroughly evaluate how a SILA progressed to what it is today. More
specifically, part II.A examines Chimel and how a SILA was developed as
an exception for warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment. Part
II.B analyzes the decision in Belton and the establishment of a rule for a
vehicle SILA. Part II.C discusses the cases that followed Belton that clarified the vehicle SILA. Part III.A examines the landmark decision in Gant,
part III.B discusses why the Gant rule misses the mark, and part III.C
presents the implications of Gant on subsequent cases dealing with a vehicle SILA. Lastly, part IV elaborates on what other options the Court in
Gant should have taken instead of establishing a new two-part rule.
II.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL

ARREST
A.

THE CHIMEL DECISION AND HOW A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST CAME TO BE

The constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search and
seizure has been well established by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and from nearly a century of case law.25 The Fourth Amendment
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized2 6
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
because of the infringement of privacy rights resulting from governmental
intrusion. 27 The Fourth Amendment requires searches with a warrant pur23.

See infra Part II.A.

27.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.

24.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719; see also infra Part III.B.2.
25.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
26.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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suant to the judicial process and "searches conducted outside the judicial

process ... are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 28
One exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is a search
incident to a lawful arrest.2 9 Although Chimel is the important SILA deci-

sion that is relied upon by Gant and Belton for its two rationales, it was not

the first decision dealing with a SILA. 30 In Agnello v. United States,31 the

Court first coined the phrase of expanding the principle of a SILA:

The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to
search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime
and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits
or as the means by which it was committed, as well as
weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody
is not to be doubted.32
This broad reading of a SILA, like other decisions before Chimel, was inconsistent as to what constituted a valid SILA when determining if a situation fell under the exception to the Fourth Amendment. 33 This inconsistency
28.
Id. at 357.
See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716; Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617
29.
(2004); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
763 (1969); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
30.
See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950) ("The right 'to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed' seems to have stemmed not
only from the acknowledged authority to search the person, but also from the longstanding
practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon
arrest." (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914))); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948) ("A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It grows out of the
inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest."); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 151 (1947) ("The opinions of this Court have clearly recognized that the search
incident to arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises under his immediate control."); Marron v. United States,
275 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1927) ("The officers were authorized to arrest for [the] crime being
committed in their presence .... They had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to
search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise." (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925))); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392
("It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the government always recognized under
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to
discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained
in many cases.").
31.
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
32.
Id. at 30.
33.
See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 755.
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led to a variety of different decisions similar to the inconsistent decisions
dealing with a vehicle SILA before Belton. 34 The Chimel decision was intended to solve the inconsistency of SILA decisions by stating the real reason for having a SILA and what constitutes a SILA.35 The real reason for
having a SILA was based upon Terry v. Ohio36 and Sibron v. New York,37

which were premised on two rationales: to protect an officer's safety, and to
protect evidence from being destroyed.38 The Court in Chimel stated that
after an arrest, the officer may, as incident to that arrest:
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or
effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well
be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it
is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary
items must, of course, be governed by a like
39
rule.

The Court defined what the grabbing area of the arrestee meant, stating that
it was "'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 40
In Chimel, the SILA involved searching the arrestee's three-bedroom
home, garage, attic, and workshop for evidence of the burglary. 41 The Court
held that the search of the entire house, other than the area where the arrest
occurred, was not a valid SILA and that the officers needed a warrant.42 The
Court reasoned that there was not a justification for searching anywhere in
the house except the area where the arrestee was arrested, because only
there would the arrestee be within reaching distance to grab a weapon or
34.
See infra Part 11.B.
35.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
36.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
37.
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
38.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762. The two rationales as stated by the Court were, "to
seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape,
as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime-things which
might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his
immediate control." Id. at 764 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
39.
Id. at 763.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.at 754.
Id.at 768.
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destroy evidence. 43 The Chimel decision attempted to make the first workable rule for a SILA; however, it left a number of unanswered questions that
affected subsequent cases which attempted to apply its rule. 44 Can an arrestee still be within reaching distance of grabbing a weapon or destroying
evidence if he is secured? How does the area of an arrestee's immediate
control apply to a situation involving an automobile? These questions,
among others, were left unanswered. One Supreme Court decision attempted to solve some of these questions by developing a bright-line rule
for a vehicle SILA. That Supreme Court decision was New York v. Belton. 5
B.

THE BELTON DECISION AND THE NEED FOR A BRIGHT-LINE RULE

While the Court in Chimel intended to solve the inconsistency of SIELA
decisions with its "immediate control," or within reaching distance rule, the
holding caused further inconsistent decisions.46 Unlike Chimel, Belton dealt
with an automobile STLA, and the Court was determined to clarify a SILA
in the automobile context.4 7
In Belton, a driver and three passengers were pulled over for speeding,
but the officer arrested all four of the vehicle's occupants for possession of
marijuana after the officer found marijuana in a jacket in the backseat of the
car.48 The four occupants were left unsecured and separated outside the
vehicle, while the officer searched the vehicle and found the jacket that
contained marijuana. 4" The Court upheld the search because the jacket was
within the area that "was 'within the arrestee's immediate control' within
the meaning of the Chimel case." 50 The Court stated that Chimel's decision
gave the justifications for a SILA, but the rule was difficult to apply in specific cases. 5' The Court developed a bright-line rule to solve the questions
Chimel left unanswered by stating that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile., 52 The purpose of this bright-line rule was to make a rule that
43.
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768.
44.
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
45.
Id.
46. Id.
47.
Chimel dealt with a SILA of a person's home while Belton dealt with a SILA of
a person's vehicle. There is a difference between the two because a person has less of an
expectation of privacy in their vehicle than in their home. See infra Part IV.A.
48.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56.
49.
Id. at 456.
50.
Id. at 462.
51.
Id. at 458.
52.
Id. at 460. The Court also stated that containers found within the passenger
compartment were allowed to be searched for a SILA because the passenger compartment is
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would be clear for officers to apply in the field and for their guidance.53 The
Court reasoned that "[a] single, familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance
the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances
they confront." 54 The Court's idea for its bright-line rule did not come out
of thin air; a decision written eight years before Belton's decision, dealing
with a SILA, had also developed a bright-line rule in the SILA context.
That Supreme Court decision was United States v. Robinson,55 in
which a driver of a vehicle was arrested for driving on a revoked license
and possession of heroin after a SILA.56 The Court stated that a SILA was a
valid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for two reasons: "[t]he first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee
by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of
the area within the control of the arrestee. '' 57 Even though the arrestee was
arrested for driving on a revoked license, the Court upheld the SILA discovery of the heroin found on the arrestee's person. 58 The Court stated that
there was no need for a case-by-case analysis, and that "[a] custodial arrest
of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification." 59 The Court explained that it did
not want to assume different driving offenses, for which a person can lawfully be arrested, are more or less dangerous than other crimes that can result in an arrest. 60 The Court stated:

within the arrestee's reach. Id. The Court also stated that regardless of whether the container
was open or closed it may be searched if it is within the passenger compartment. Id.at 461.
The Court stated, "since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy
interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any
privacy interest the arrestee may have." Id.But the Court also noted that the SILA only
applied to the interior of the passenger compartment and not the trunk. Id.at 461 n.4.
53.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 ("A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all
sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in the field."'
(quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974))).
54.
Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 21314 (1979)).
55.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id.at 220-21.
56.
57.
Id.at 224.
58.
Id.at 234-35.
59.
Id.at 235.
60.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
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It is scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is
far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting
him to the police station than in the case of the relatively
fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop.
This is an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests
alike for purposes ofsearchjustification.6'
The Court justified treating all custodial arrests the same
because the arrests
62
themselves are inherently dangerous to police officers.
Belton's decision used the same reasoning from Robinson, by treating
all arrests the same, when the Court held that the passenger compartment of
any vehicle may be searched as incident to an arrest, because the passenger
compartment is always assumed to be within reaching distance of the arrestee. 63 The Court eliminated the case-by-case analysis of what was the reaching distance of the arrestee. 64 For example, a court would look to see if
there were specific facts that demonstrated whether an arrestee was truly
within reaching distance, like looking at a person's arm length, or the length
of the passenger compartment from the driver's seat.65 Belton's decision
was simple: follow Chimel's rationale of an arrestee's immediate control
and make a clear-cut rule for a SILA of a vehicle similar to Robinson by
holding that all passenger compartments may be searched as incident to that
lawful arrest.66 Unfortunately, Belton's rule caused problems to decisions
that followed it because it did not address other concerns, like whether the
arrestee had to be an occupant or a recent67occupant, but the Court, in two
separate decisions, addressed this concern.
C.

THE THORNTON DECISION

Just six years ago, the Supreme Court, in Thornton v. United States,
had the opportunity to revisit Belton and decide whether to overrule its decision or to uphold and clarify it. 68 The Court chose to uphold Belton and
61.
Id. (emphasis added).
62.
Id. at 235 n.5 ("The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest,
and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.").
63.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,459 (1981).
64.
Id. at 458.
65.
Id. at 459-60.
66.
Id. at 460.
67.
See generally Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (2009) (limiting Belton
since lower courts were permitting broad searches based on Belton's rule); Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 617 (2004) (determining whether Belton applied to a recent
occupant of a vehicle).
68.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617.
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clarify its rule, holding that Belton's rule governs SILA situations when the
vehicle's occupant is in the vehicle or has already stepped out of the vehicle.69
In Thornton, a police officer followed a vehicle into a driveway after
observing suspicious activity and confronted the driver, after he exited the
vehicle, for driving with license tags that did not match his vehicle. 70 The
officer arrested the driver for possession of drugs on the driver's person
following the driver's consent for the officer to search him. 71 The officer

placed the driver in the back of the squad car and searched the driver's vehicle, finding a handgun under the driver's seat.72 In deciding whether the
search was valid, the Court referred to Chimel, but stated, "[T]he Chimel
principle had proved difficult to apply in specific cases. 73 The Court was
faced with the question of "whether Belton's rule is limited to situations
where the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is
inside the vehicle, or whether it applies as well when the officer first makes
contact with the arrestee after the latter has stepped out of his vehicle. 7 4
The Court held that the Belton rule applies even when "an officer does not
make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle., 75 The Court
stated that a suspect who is standing next to a vehicle presents the same
concerns as a suspect who is still in the vehicle.76 The Court noted that there
is no reason to make two different rules for the same situation since there is
a presumed risk of danger 77 to an officer if a suspect is standing next to a
vehicle or located inside of it. 78 The Court expanded Belton's rule to say

that "[s]o long as an arrestee is the sort of 'recent occupant' of a vehicle
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

Id.
Id. at 617-18.
ld. at 618.
Id.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 620.
Id. at 617.

Id.

76.
Id. at 621 ("In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as
the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle.").
77.
Id. When there is an arrest, there is a greater likelihood that the officer's safety
is endangered. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) ("[T]he danger to the police
officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty,
and not from the grounds for arrest." (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235
n.5 (1973))). In Knowles, the Court, in a unanimous decision, held that there is no search
incident to a citation. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118-19. The Court stated, "Where there is no
formal arrest.., a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence." Id. at 117 (quoting Cupp v.
Murphy 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)). The Court distinguished a citation from an arrest by
stating that "[t]he threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good
deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest." Id.
78.
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 621.
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such as petitioner was here, officers may search that vehicle incident to the
arrest., 79 The Court's reasoning for this rule was for it to be similar to Belton's bright-line rule based on Robinson, which was to eliminate the subjective and fact specific inquiries of individual cases. 80 The Court did not address the main concerns of Belton's rule which would lead Thornton and
Belton to be revisited by a future Supreme Court decision that would essentially overrule both of their decisions.
III.
A.

THE DECISION THAT CHANGED SILA AS WE KNOW IT

THE GANT DECISION

On April 21, 2009, in Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court, in a narrow
5-4 decision, significantly changed Belton's bright-line rule for a vehicle
S1LA. 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address concerns from
lower courts and legal scholars as to whether a SILA is reasonable when a
person is secured in a squad car, and thus, whether Belton should be upheld
or overruled. 82 In Gant, the suspect, who was arrested for driving on a suspended license, was handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car."
Performing a SILA based on Belton's bright-line rule, officers searched the
car and found a gun and a bag of cocaine in a pocket of a jacket left on the
backseat. 84 The Court had to determine both whether this was a valid SILA
and the validity of Belton.85
Similar to the decisions in Thornton and Belton, the Court started its
analysis with Chimel by evaluating whether the search was reasonable or
not, so as to qualify as a SILA exception to the Fourth Amendment.86 The
Court explained Chimel's two rationales for a SILA, 87 and added that "[i]f
there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for a [SILA] exception
are absent and the rule does not apply." 88 The Court then addressed Belton
79.
Id. at 623-24.
80.
Id. at 623 ("Under petitioner's proposed rule, an officer approaching a suspect
who has just alighted from his vehicle would have to determine whether he actually confronted or signaled confrontation with the suspect while he remained in the car, or whether
the suspect exited his vehicle unaware of, and for reasons unrelated to, the officer's presence. This determination would be inherently subjective and highly fact specific ...[which]
Belton sought to avoid." (citing Belton v. New York, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981))).
81.
129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009).
Id.at 1716.
82.
Id.at 1715.
83.

84.

Id.

85.

Id. at 1714.

86.
87.
88.

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969).
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
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and its rule89 for providing that the "articles inside the relatively narrow
compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might
reach.' 90 The Court was troubled that Belton had been "widely understood
to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if
there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the
time of the search." 91 The Court attributed the broad reading of Belton's
rule to Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton.92 The Court rejected this broad
interpretation of Belton to allow a SILA for every arrest of a recent occupant, because the search would be unreasonable as it would not satisfy the
two rationales of Chimel.93
The Court decided not to overrule Belton, but rather to limit Belton's
rule by establishing a two-part rule to justify a SILA based upon Chimel.
The two-part rule stated:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's
arrest only [1] if the arrestee is within reaching distance of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search or [2]
it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of
the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a
search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to
the warrant requirement applies.94
The Court justified the first part of its new rule based on the two rationales
of Chimel for a valid SILA; because, if an arrestee was not within reaching
89.

90.

See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).

Id. at 1718.
91.
92.
Id.In Belton, Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion, "[T]he Court
today disregards these principles, and instead adopts a fiction-that the interior of a car is
always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car." Belton,
453 U.S. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further stated:
[T]he Court for the first time grants police officers authority to conduct a
warrantless "area" search under circumstances where there is no chance
that the arrestee "might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Under the approach taken today, the result would presumably be
the same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before placing them under arrest ....
Id.at 468 (quoting Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)) (citation omitted). Lower
courts interpreted Belton's bright-line rule based on the majority's opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent that every recent occupant who had been recently arrested was at some point or
time within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of the vehicle and a SILA was
permissible. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
93.
94.
Id.at 1723-24.
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distance of the vehicle, then he or she would not be able to endanger an
officer's safety by grabbing a weapon or destroying evidence in the vehicle. 95 The Court further added that the arrestee also needed to be unsecured, because if an arrestee had on handcuffs, the same concerns of an
officer's safety and the destruction of evidence would be absent. 96 The
Court justified the second part of its rule, even though the rule does not
follow Chimel, because it is based on the offense for the arrest. 97 The Court
98
distinguished the offense of the arrest of Gant from Belton and Thornton.
Gant was arrested for a traffic violation, driving on a suspended license, in
which there would be no reason or expectation to find evidence of a suspended license in Gant's vehicle. 99 Belton and Thornton were both arrested
for drug offenses, and officers could have reasonably believed evidence of
drugs, or the offenses for their arrests, might be found in both of their vehicles. 00 The argument for a "reason to believe" evidence of the arrest
might be found in the vehicle was first discussed by Justice Scalia in his
concurring opinion in Thornton.10 The Gant Court adopted Justice Scalia's
"reason to believe" standard from his concurring opinion, because the Court
concluded that a search based on certain offenses, like possession of drugs,
would be justified in the automobile context.10 2 The Court mainly supported
the "reason to believe" standard because
of the threat to privacy permitted
03
by the broad reading of Belton's rule.'
95.

Id. at 1719.

96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia concurred in Thornton because he believed the Belton rule for allowing SILA
could only be justified on the "reason to believe" standard when the two rationales of Chimel
were absent. See id. He believed there was case law that supported an evidence gathering
approach. See id. Justice Scalia stated, "Belton cannot reasonably be explained as a mere
application of Chimel. Rather, it is a return to the broader sort of search-incident to arrest
that we allowed before Chimel." Id. at 63 1. He explained his "reason to believe" rule further
by noting that
[a] motorist may be arrested for a wide variety of offenses; in many cases, there is no reasonable basis to believe relevant evidence might be
found in the car. I would therefore limit Belton searches to cases where it
is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle.
Id. at 632 (citations omitted).
102.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1714.
103.
Id. at 1720 ("A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing
evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat
to the privacy of countless individuals.").
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The Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court and applied its new
rule for a SILA by holding that the search of Gant's vehicle was unreasonable because Gant was not within reaching distance of the vehicle and officers could not have believed evidence of Gant's offense would be in the vehicle.'0 4
B.

WHY THE GANT RULE MISSES THE MARK

The Court's new rule for a SILA misses the mark of clarifying a SILA
in the automobile context and departs from the essential reasoning of Belton' 0 5 and Chimel.10 6 Furthermore, the Court's new rule will have implications on how lower courts will interpret its decision. 0 7 Thus, it is necessary
to evaluate how the Court should have decided differently to avoid these
implications.' 8
1.

Gant's Rule Departsfrom the Reasoning ofBelton

Belton's bright-line rule has been relied upon for the past twenty-eight
years to determine valid SILAs and was reaffirmed six years ago by Thornton. 10 9 Gant's two-part rule significantly departs from the main rationale of
Belton, which was to establish a bright-line rule for a SILA in the automobile context."0 Gant's two-part rule recreates the problems and deficiencies
courts were having before Belton, such as how to determine what constitutes a valid SILA based on a case-by-case analysis.' 1 In Gant, the Court
held in the first part of its rule that an arrestee has to be unsecured and within reaching distance of the vehicle. 12 Whether there is a valid SILA based
on these two requirements depends on a factual analysis, which might produce differing results similar to the mixed decisions that existed before Belton.113 This rule is similar to what Chimel's rule proved to lower courts, that
104.

105.
106.
107.

Id.at 1719.

See infra Part III.B. 1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.C.

108.
See infra Part IV.
109.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110.
See supra Part II.B. The rationale for establishing a bright-line rule for SILA in
the automobile context was that lower courts were having difficulty applying Chimel's "immediate control" rule to vehicles. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S 454, 458 (1981).
111.
Belton's rule was intended to eliminate the factual case-by-case analysis of
determining what constituted a valid SILA and to establish a bright-line rule for officers,
who make quick judgments and have little legal expertise, as compared to lawyers and
judges, to conduct valid searches. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
112.
See supra Part III.A (relating to the first part of Gant'snew rule).
113.
In Belton, the Court stated that "[some] decisions in cases... have upheld such
warrantless searches as incident to lawful arrests. On the other hand ...[cases] in compara-
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it would be difficult to apply in certain cases.1 14 There will be certain scenarios or factual situations in which courts will have trouble applying Gant's
new rule. For example, what will be within reaching distance of a vehicle?1 15 Is it more or less likely a person can reach for an item in a vehicle
if he is lying face down, sitting down, or standing up? Will officers risk

danger to themselves by having unsecured arrestees standing or sitting

within reaching distance of a vehicle to effectuate a valid SILA?1 16 The

second part of Gant's rule also departs from Belton because the Belton
Court stated, in its decision, that its rule did not change the two rationales of
Chimel.l I7 In Belton, the Court stated that its holding "in no way alters the
fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' 1 8 Gant's "reason to
believe" standard completely eliminates the two rationales of Chimel and
thus departs from Belton's holding to not alter Chimel for the purposes of a
SILA.1 19

The Court's strongest argument for departing from Belton's rule is

based upon Chimel's two principles for a SILA. If an arrestee is secured
and locked in the back of a squad car, or is not otherwise within reaching
distance of a vehicle, then there is no threat to an officer's safety that the
arrestee could reach for a gun in the vehicle or that the arrestee could de-

stroy evidence in the vehicle. 120 This is assuming that the reaching distance

ble factual circumstances, have been held constitutionally invalid." 453 U.S. at 459 (citations
omitted). The Court did not like how similar searches were valid in some decisions and
invalid in others because "[w]hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled
principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority." Id. at 459-60.
114.
Gant's two-part rule will be difficult to apply, given that there are two different
parts of the rule, because in one situation a search of the vehicle after the arrestee is secured
is not a valid SILA; however, it still could be a valid search if the officer has reason to believe evidence of the arrest could be found in the vehicle. See infra Part III.B.2.
115.
See infra Part I1I.C.3.
116.
See infra Part I1.C.2.
117.
Gant's "reason to believe" standard significantly departs from reasoning of
Chimel and Belton for having SILAs.
118.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3.
119.
See infra Part 1I.B.2.
120.
See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (explaining that a broad
reading of Belton would alter the justifications of Chimel, and that a SILA is only valid if
"the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search."); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[The arrestee] was handcuffed and secured in the back of the officer's squad car.
The risk that he would nevertheless 'grab a weapon or evidentiary item' from his car was
remote in the extreme."); see also David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton's
Per Se Rule Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1287, 1354 (2005) (arguing that if an arrestee is handcuffed and secured in a squad
car, then a SILA is not needed to protect an officer or prevent evidence from being de-
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rule is applied at the time of the search rather than at the time of the arrest.12 ' There may be some indication, however, that the decisions in Belton
and Thornton both addressed this issue and permitted a SILA regardless if a
person is within reaching distance of the vehicle. First, the Court in Belton
overruled the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Belton,' 22 in which it was ruled that the search of Belton's vehicle was not valid because he was not within reaching distance of the jacket located inside
the vehicle. 123 The Court in Belton responded that "[t]he jacket was located
inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had
been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the
area which we have concluded was 'within the arrestce's immediate control' within the meaning of the Chimel case.' 24 It would seem as though
the Court held that the search of the jacket was a valid SILA because it was,
at some point in time, within the arrestee's immediate control before the
arrest, even though the arrestee might not have been able to reach it after
the arrest. 25 This would be the reason why Justice Brennan stated in his
dissent in Belton, that the majority's opinion grants officers the authority to
conduct a SILA when there is no possibility that26an arrestee can gain access
to a weapon or destroy evidence in the vehicle.
Second, the Court in Thornton held that the search of Thornton's vehicle was valid based upon the similar facts in Belton and the need for Belton's bright-line rule in the automobile context, even though the two rationales of Chimel might be absent.' 27 The Court stated:
It is unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached
under the driver's seat for his gun once he was outside of
his automobile. But the firearm and the passenger comstroyed); Robert A. Stern, Comment, Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton: The
Supreme Court Opens Car Doors to ContainerSearches, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 291, 311 (1982)
(arguing that the holding in Belton is inconsistent with Chimel because the two rationales are
eliminated when an arrestee is handcuffed and secured in a squad car).
121.
See infra Part IV.A. If it is at the time of the search, then almost all searches
would be invalid because arrestees will be secured and in a squad car. If it is at the time of
the arrest, then most searches would be valid.
122.
407 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
123.
Id. at 422 ("The privacy interest of the arrestee in an object remains intact once
he is effectively neutralized or the object is within the exclusive control of the police. At that
point, any exigency which would otherwise have justified a warrantless search has been
dissipated and the search is no longer an incident to the arrest. The critical inquiry focuses
upon the extent to which the arrestee may gain access to the property rather than the time or
space between the arrest and search." (citations omitted)).
124.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (emphasis added).
125.
See id.at 462-63.
126.
Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127.
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622-23 (2004).
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partment in general were no more inaccessible than were
the contraband and the passenger compartment in Belton.
The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what
items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any
particular moment, justifies
the sort of generalization which
28
Belton enunciated.

Based upon the interpretations from the decisions in Belton and Thornton,
and Justice Brennan's dissent in Belton, lower courts allowed a SILA when
the arrestee was secured and locked in the back of a squad car. 129 The Court
30
stated in Gant that its decision did not overrule Belton and Thornton;'
however, its decision does just that. Gant needed to either uphold Belton
and Thornton or overrule them entirely because the Court's new rule significantly departs from the reasoning of both of those cases.13 1 Belton intended
to make a bright-line rule for a SILA in the automobile context, and Thornton not only reaffirmed that need for a bright-line rule, but also expanded
it. 132 Both cases made it apparent that a search could be conducted if the
arrestee was a recent occupant and that it did not matter whether the arres33
tee was secured or not, so long as the arrestee was a recent occupant.
Gant departs from the reasoning of both of these cases by eliminating Belton's bright-line rule, in the automobile context, of what constitutes a valid
SILA.
2.

The Second Partof Gant's Rule Departsfrom the Reasoning of Chimel

In Gant, the Court heavily emphasized why the Belton rule should be
limited because a broad reading of it eliminates the two rationales of Chimel for a valid SILA. 134 The first part of the Court's rule strictly adheres to

128.
Id.
129.
See, e.g., United States v. Mapp, 476 F.3d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States
v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.
2006); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Osife, 398
F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. White, 871 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1989); Rainey v.
Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 89 (Ky. 2006); State v. Scott, 200 S.W.3d 41 (Mo. Ct. App.

2006).

130.
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (2009). The Court justified the searches
in Belton and Thornton based on its "reason to believe" standard, which distinguished those

searches from the search of Gant. See id. at 1722.
131.
See infraPart V.B.
132. See supra Part II.C.
133.

134.

See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 623-24.

Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
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the two rationales of Chimel.135 The second part of its rule for a valid
SILA-reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the
arrest-significantly departs from Chimel.136 This "reason to believe" standard eliminates the two rationales of Chimel for conducting a S1LA. While
a person locked in the back of a squad car during a SILA fails under the
first part of Gant's test, 137 it does not necessarily fail under the second part
of the test. 138 The Court used Justice Scalia's concurring opinion from
Thornton to establish the second part of its rule to justify the searches in
Belton and Thornton.'39 This reasoning seems unjustifiable if its purpose
was to add this rule to justify the searches of both of those cases but not to
overrule those cases. Justifying searches for a "reason to believe" standard
departs from the first part of the rule by eliminating the two rationales of
Chimel.140 The Court used this reasoning to distinguish the fact that the
arrests in Belton and Thornton were drug-related, while the offense in Gant
was driving on a suspended license.' 4' This "reason to believe" standard
eliminates Chimel's two rationales for SILA cases when it was the only
justification for them in the first place.
The "reason to believe" standard also departs from Chimel because it
may permit searches beyond what is in the "immediate control" of the arrestee or what is within reaching distance of the arrestee. 142 While Belton
permitted a SILA of the passenger compartment of automobiles based upon
Chimel,143 Gant's "reason to believe" standard may extend searches to
See id. ("[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to
135.
a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search."); see also supra Part III.A.
136.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (acknowledging that the second part of its rule did not
follow Chimel).
137.
It fails the first part of the test because a person locked or secured in the back of
a squad car during a SILA is not within reaching distance of a vehicle and cannot grab a
weapon or destroy evidence. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1716.
138.
A person locked in the back of a squad car would not necessarily fail under the
second part of the test, because the SILA would be valid if the officer reasonably believed
there was evidence of the offense in the vehicle. See supra Part III.A.
139.
See supra Part III.A. Belton and Thornton both involved offenses related to drug
possession which an officer could reasonably believe evidence of their arrest could be found
in their vehicle. See supra Part II.B-C. Gant involved driving on a suspended license where
there could not be a reasonable belief that evidence of the arrest could be found in the vehicle. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1722.
140.
If the Court reasons that valid searches incident to a lawful arrest are only justifiable under Chimel's two rationales (officer safety and preservation of evidence), then how
can the Court allow searches incident to a lawful arrest when those two rationales are absent?
141.
See supra Part III.A.
142.
See infra Part II.C. 1.
143.
See supra Part ll.B. Belton permitted the search of passenger compartments as
incident to an arrest, because the Court found passenger compartments were inevitably with-
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places like an automobile's trunk, or places that are not within reaching
distance or "immediate control" of an arrestee.' 44 By eliminating Chimel's
two rationales for a SILA, the second part of the Court's new rule is not
justified for a SILA as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.
C.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF GANT ON FUTURE SILA CASES

1.

The Effect on Probable Cause

The Court made a mistake by looking at Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Thornton to justify the searches in Belton and Thornton because
there was already a rule in place that the Court should have looked to instead-probable cause. Probable cause should have been the standard the
Court looked to instead of developing a new rule for searching vehicles
without a warrant.1 45 Probable cause is a known exception to the Fourth
Amendment for allowing warrantless searches of vehicles. 146 In Carroll v.
United States,147 the Court stated:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search
and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
148
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure is valid.
For there to be probable cause, a court "must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand,
the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' ' 149 In Gant, the Court acknowledged probable cause
in the reaching distance or "immediate control" of the arrestee. New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
144.
See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1731 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court did not
address certain concerns about the second part of its rule because "[t]he Belton rule was
limited in this way because the passenger compartment was considered to be the area that
vehicle occupants can generally reach, but since the second part of the new rule is not based
on officer safety or the preservation of evidence, the ground for this limitation is obscure"
(citation omitted)).
145.
See Rudstein, supra note 120, at 1345-46.
146.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) ("[T]he exception to
the warrant requirement established in Carroll-the scope of which we consider in this
case-applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause.").
147.
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
148.
Id. at 149.
149.
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
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when it stated, "Unlike the searches permitted by Justice Scalia's opinion
concurring in the judgment in Thornton ... Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of
the search authorized is broader."1 50 The Court did not address why it did
not use probable cause over its "reason to believe" standard, except that the
"reason to believe" standard justified the searches in Belton and Thornton.' 51
Why would the Court adopt a "reason to believe" standard over probable cause? One reason could be that probable cause authorizes the search of
any area of a vehicle where evidence might be found. 52 Any area could be
areas like a trunk or some remote, hidden compartment in a vehicle. Searching a place like a vehicle's trunk or some remote, hidden compartment
would not be within reaching distance of a vehicle or the "immediate control" of the arrestee. 153 In Belton, the Court made it specifically clear that its
rule did not apply to an arrestee's trunk.1 54 The "reason to believe" standard
may or may not extend a search to any area of a vehicle, 155 but the Court
never thoroughly explained the extent of what the search covered, except
that the search had to be related to the offense of the arrest. 156 Probable
cause may allow for a broader search and for evidence other than the offense of arrest, but there does not seem to be a major factor as to why the
"reason to believe" standard should be used over probable cause. 157 It seems
likely that the Court was focused on narrowing broad searches by limiting
the search to evidence related to the offense of the arrest, but this is not
150.
Arizona v. Cant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009). In Ross, the Court held that
probable cause is valid where
[T]he scope of the warrantless search authorized by that exception is no
broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize
by warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
151.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1721.
152.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21.
153.
See supra Part II.B.
154.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n.4 (1981) ("Our holding encompasses
only the interior of the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the
trunk.").
155.
See Wayne R. LaFave, Search Incident to an Arrest, in 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 UPDATE § 7. 1 (d)
(4th ed. 2009) (arguing that the second part of Gant's rule may uphold searches of vehicles'
trunks but it is doubted and should be limited to what a Belton search would entail).
156.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719.
157.
See Joseph G. Cook, Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement-Searches Incident to Arrest-The Chimel-Standard-The Parameters of a Chimel-Search-Arrests
Made in Vehicles, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 3d § 4:48 (2009); see also
LaFave, supra note 155, § 7.1(d).
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probable cause, nor is it a SILA related to the two rationales of Chimel. 58
Probable cause could have justified the search in Belton because the officer
smelled burnt marijuana, and therefore, he had probable cause to search the
vehicle and the contents of that vehicle for evidence of marijuana.'5 9 An
officer smelling a strong odor of a controlled substance from a person's
vehicle establishes probable cause for that officer to believe that the vehicle
contains controlled substances. 16 Probable cause could have also justified
the vehicle search in Thornton because after the officer found drugs on
Thornton's person, the officer
could have established that he had probable
6'
vehicle.'
the
cause to search
Instead of adopting the "reason to believe" standard, the Court should
have used probable cause to distinguish Gant from Belton and Thornton
because the officers in Gant did not have probable cause to search his vehicle.' 62 SILA and probable cause are two separate exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 63 In
Gant, the Court unnecessarily blurred these two exceptions together to
create one rule, and in doing so, it developed a two-part rule that adopts
158.
In Gant, the Court did not like how Belton's rule affected people's privacy. The
Court held,
A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an
individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis
for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle,
creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1720.
159.
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455-56. Ross would have permitted the warrantless
search of Belton's vehicle once the officer smelled burnt marijuana and established probable
cause authorizing him to search the vehicle and the vehicle's contents for evidence of the
burnt marijuana. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
160.
See, e.g., Hall v. State, 981 A.2d 1106, 1113 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2009) ("The strong
odor of PCP establishes probable cause to believe the vehicle occupied by Hall contained
evidence of criminal activity."); see also Rudstein, supra note 120, at 1347-48.
161.
In Thornton v. United States, officers pulled Thornton over for having different
license tags for his vehicle and asked him if he had any drugs or weapons on him or his
vehicle, in which he responded that he did not. 541 U.S. 615, 618 (2004). One of the officers
performed a pat down and found a bag of marijuana and one bag of cocaine. Id. Even though
the officer found a hand gun and not drugs, the officers did have probable cause to search
Thornton's vehicle because they had found drugs on his person. See id Finding drugs on his
person could establish that the officer had probable cause that Thornton had more drugs in
his vehicle. See id.
162.
In Gant, although the officers had a tip that the residence in which Gant was
staying was used for selling drugs, Gant was arrested solely for the purpose of driving on a
suspended license, and consequently, "there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for
driving with a suspended license." 129 S. Ct. at 1714. There was no evidence or information
that there were drugs in Gant's vehicle and officers would not have any probable cause to
search his vehicle. See id.
163.
See LaFave, supra note 155, § 7.1(d).
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SILA in its first part and a down-graded version of probable cause in its
second part. The Court was focused on adopting a new rule to justify the
searches in Belton and Thornton when there was already an existing rule
that could have justified the searches of both of those cases. The offense of
an arrest has never been a factor for SILA searches. 164 Probable cause
should be the standard for a warrantless search based on the offense of an
arrest, not a "reason to believe" standard, because probable cause is a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment and should remain a separate exception from a SILA.
2.

The Effect on Law Enforcement Agencies

One major effect of Gant's decision is its impact on law enforcement
agencies across the country. Belton's bright-line rule has been relied upon
by law enforcement agencies for the past twenty-eight years for conducting
a valid SILA. 165 Relying on Belton, law enforcement departments and their
officers were taught to handcuff a person after any arrest, place them in a
squad car, and then conduct a search as incident to that arrest. 66 If Belton's
bright-line rule was interpreted as permitting a SILA, as long as the arrestee
was a recent occupant, then why would officers not secure arrestees before
conducting a SILA for their safety? 16 7 Not securing an arrestee during a
SILA could be dangerous and even unreasonable for the officer conducting
the search.
Justice Scalia first recognized this in his concurring opinion in Thornton: "Indeed, if an officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search, one could argue that the search is unreasonable
precisely because the dangerous conditions justifying it existed only by
virtue of the officer's failure to follow sensible procedures.' 68 This statement is important because of how it relates to the Court's new rule in Gant.
In Gant, the first part of the Court's rule creates the situation in which an
169
Having
an
a valid
be risking
officer willarrestee
distance
in reaching
to be SILA.
vehicle just
standhisor safety
sit neartoa effectuate
unsecured
164.
See supra Part II.B. Belton used the reasoning from Robinson to treat all arrests
the same given the confrontational nature of an arrest. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718-19, 1722.
165.
166.
See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule inSearch of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 657, 665-66 (2002).
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
167.
("The popularity of the practice is not hard to fathom. If Belton entitles an officer to search a
vehicle upon arresting the driver despite having taken measures that eliminate any danger,
what rational officer would not take those measures?").
Id. at 627.
168.
169.
See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1726 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The first part of this new
").
rule may endanger arresting officers ....
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of it for a valid search does not seem justified, as it puts an officer's safety
at risk. 170 In his concurring opinion in Gant, Justice Scalia addressed this
concern and commented on the first part of the Court's rule and how it
"fails to provide the needed guidance to arresting officers and also leaves
much room for manipulation, inviting officers to leave the scene unsecured
(at least where dangerous suspects are not involved) in order to conduct a
vehicle search.' 17' There does not seem to be a balance of an officer's safety and the performance of a valid SILA under the first part of the Gant rule.
The reduced privacy people are afforded with a vehicle SILA should be
taken into account. 72 Belton intended to make a rule that protected officers
by eliminating factual 73scenarios that officers would have to follow when
making a valid SILA. 1
Every arrest should be treated the same because the risk of danger to
an officer is high whenever there is an arrest. 174 The Belton bright-line rule
was intended to treat all arrests the same, no matter what the offense of the
arrest was, because of the confrontational nature of an arrest and the mobility of vehicles. 175 Officers should not have to manipulate searches for them
to be valid by risking their safety in the process. As one author stated,
"[s]ociety asks much of its law enforcement officers.., it would be 'unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.',176

3.

The Effect on SILA in the Vehicle Context

The Gant two-part rule will have a profound effect on a SILA in the
vehicle context. The two-part rule completely diminishes the reasoning of
Belton and Thornton of having a bright-line rule for a SILA. Belton and
Thornton were intended to eliminate the case-by-case analysis of factual
scenarios to determine whether or not a SILA was valid. 77 The two-part
170.
Justice Scalia stated in his concurring opinion in Thornton, "'[i]t does not make
sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police
procedures."' Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Mitchell, 82 F.3d 146, 152 (7th Cir. 1996)).
171.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
172.
See infra Part IV.A.
173.
See supra Part 1I.B.
174.
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973).
175.
See Kevin R. Glandon, Note, Bright Lines on the Road: The Fourth Amendment,
the Automatic Companion Rule, the "Automatic Container" Rule, and a New Rule for Drugor Firearm-Related Traffic Stop Companion Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (2009).
176.
Id at 1283 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)).
177.
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622-23 (2004) ("The need for a
clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of
what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies
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rule will be very fact specific 178 and will lead to different results in each
different situation. 179 The first part of the rule endangers the safety of officers to effectuate a valid SILA. 18 ° The second part of the rule completely
ignores SILA cases and the whole rationale for having a SILA as an exception to the Fourth Amendment.' 8' The second part of the rule might even

expand the search of a vehicle beyond what Belton and Chimel permitted.' 82
Why is the second part of the rule limited to offenses of the arrest? Are
there not certain situations that would lead an officer to believe that there is
evidence or could be evidence in a person's vehicle after that vehicle has
been pulled over? 183 In Gant, the Court justified the second part of its rule
because "[iun many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic
violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains
relevant evidence."' 84 Why is this so? Certain traffic offenses that result in
an arrest can be dangerous,"' and certain traffic offenses can give an officer
a reasonable basis to believe that a vehicle contains relevant incriminating
evidence.186 Driving under the influence (DUI) is considered a traffic of-

the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated."); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 458 (1981).
178.
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The first
part of the Court's new rule .. .reintroduces the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific
decisionmaking [sic] that the Belton rule was adopted to avoid.").
For example, how close was the arrestee to the vehicle during the search? Was
179.
he or she within reaching distance? Was he or she secured in any way? Was there anything
that prevented him or her from being able to be within reaching distance of the vehicle? Did
the officer have reason to believe there was evidence related to the offense of the arrest in
the vehicle? Would the offense of the arrest lead an officer to believe there is evidence in the
vehicle? All of these factual scenarios must be taken into account given the Gant two-part
rule.
See supra Part III.C.2.
180.
181.
See supra Part III.B.2.
182.
See supra Part III.C.1.
183.
Is it not appropriate for certain factors to be taken into consideration? For example, criminal history when a driver's license or license plate is checked, speeding excessively, attempting to evade or escape from police officers, or drug trafficking areas. Justice
Alito similarly noted in his dissenting opinion in Gant that "it is not easy to see why an
officer should not be able to search when the officer has reason to believe that the vehicle in
question possesses evidence of a crime other than the crime of arrest." Gant, 129 S. Ct. at
1731 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (majority opinion).
184.
See Glandon, supra note 175, at 1282 (arguing that officers face an increased
185.
degree of danger when arresting a person during a traffic stop).
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 621 (2004) ("Every arrest must be
186.
presumed to present a risk of danger to the arresting officer." (quoting Washington v.
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982))); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) ("This is not
to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It
plainly is not."); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 n.5 (1973) ("The danger to
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fense, so would it be unreasonable for an officer to believe81 7that the vehicle
contains relevant evidence for driving under the influence?'
Another effect Gant's decision has on a SILA is that numerous cases
are being reheard based on the new rule from Gant. The problem is that
officers in these cases were using the Belton rule to perform searches, and
now, most of these searches are being held valid or invalid based on the
Gant rule.' 88 There are two issues that conflict with each other that have
been raised as a result of the Gant decision. The first issue is whether Gant
should be applied retroactively to all cases that were pending during its
decision.' 89 This would mean the Gant rule goes into effect for all cases that
were pending during its decision that were not yet final, and thus a Belton
search would most likely be invalid.' 90 The second issue is whether the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.' ' This would
mean searches conducted under Belton would be upheld as good-faith to the
former law, even though they should be invalid based upon Gant. 92 Lower
courts have mixed opinions as to which rule should govern. In United
States v. Gonzales,'93 the Ninth Circuit for the United States Court of Appeals reversed Gonzales's conviction-which was the result of a Belton
search-based on Gant because the decision was pending, and not final,
using the retroactive principle.' 94 In United States v. McCane,'95 another
decision pending during the Gant decision, the Tenth Circuit for the United
the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the groundsfor arrest." (emphasis added)).
187.
See Lawrence Taylor & Steven Oberman, Suppression of Evidence, in DRUNK
DRWING DEFENSE § 11.08 (Supp. 2009).
188.
See, e.g., State v. Snapp, 219 P.3d 971, 975-76 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
189.
See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) ("[A] decision of this
Court construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied retroactively to all convictions that
were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered.").
190.
This means that courts have to abide by the Gant rule even though the searches
were performed under the Belton rule. See, e.g., Snapp, 219 P.3d at 975-76 ("'[A] new rule
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet final' ....
Thus, to the extent that Gant is a
'clear break' from the past, it applies with the same force as if it were on the books at the
time of Snapp's arrest." (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987))).
191.
See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701-02 (2009) ("[E]vidence should
be suppressed 'only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment."' (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1987))).
192.
See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 637 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
("In this case, application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would mean
that, if the officers conducted a valid search incident-to-arrest or officer-safety search as
those terms were understood prior to Gant, the evidence would not be suppressed.").
193.
578 F.3d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009).
194.
Id. at 1131-32.
195.
573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009).
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States Court of Appeals applied the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule over the retroactive principle by upholding the Belton search, even
though it stated that the search would fail under Gant.'96 This is another
example of how the Gant decision has had a significant effect on SILA
cases that were pending before its decision, and will continue to affect future cases that will interpret its decision.
IV.
A.

HOW THE COURT IN GANT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED

REVISITING CHIMEL

The Court in Gant should have decided differently rather than establishing a new rule that limits or even overrules Belton. To evaluate how the
Court should have decided differently, Chimel must be discussed and evaluated once more. In Gant, the Court stated that the Belton rule is too broad
because the justifications of the two rationales of Chimel are absent.1 97 The
Court overlooked the fact that the SILA conducted in Chimel was conducted at a person's home and was substantially different from a SILA of a
vehicle.
First, a vehicle can be distinguished from a house. It has been established through case law and scholarly articles that there is a lessened
amount of privacy for vehicles as compared to houses.' 98 Vehicles are highly visible to the public since they have windows on all four sides, and officers can see through these windows to look inside vehicles.' 99 On the other
hand, the privacy of a person's home is an area of most heightened protections against the government. 200 In addition, the mobility of vehicles poses a
concern to justify searches of vehicles rather than people's homes, because
196.

In McCane, an officer conducted a SILA after he arrested the suspect for driving

on a suspended license and found a firearm. Id. at 1038-39. The court held the search was
invalid based on Gant's decision but affirmed denial of the motion to suppress based upon
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1039.
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009); Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 631 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Rudstein, supra note 120, at
1343-44; Glandon, supra note 175, at 1278.
199.
If an officer is approaching a vehicle and sees contraband on the back seat of a
person's vehicle then he may seize that contraband for being in plain view. See, e.g., Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). Under the plain view doctrine, "if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately
apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it
without a warrant." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
200.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Fourth and Fifth
Amendments were described . . . as protection against all governmental invasions 'of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies if life."' (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886))).
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it is easier for a person to evade law enforcement agencies by driving
away. 20' The distinction between a vehicle and a home is significant, and
there should be separate rules for a SILA of a vehicle and for a SILA of a
person's home.
Second, looking at the factual distinctions between Chimel and a vehicle SILA, the searches are quite different. The suspect in Chimel was arrested the moment he entered into his house when officers gave him an
arrest warrant. 20 2 The suspect's three-bedroom home was searched in every
room, the garage, attic, workshop, and many drawers in various rooms in
order to seize evidence of his arrest for burglary of a coin shop.203 The
Court stated that the only place that the police were justified to search was
the room where the arrest occurred and the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. 204 A SILA based on Belton is narrower than the SILA
that was conducted in Chimel. A vehicle is a lot smaller than a house and a
Belton search limits the scope of a search for a vehicle.2 °5 In a SILA of a
vehicle, a person who is arrested in their vehicle, or outside their vehicle,2 6
has only the passenger compartment within their immediate control.20 7
Therefore, the scope of a SILA when a person is arrested in their vehicle is
limited to the passenger compartment 20 8 and not any other place of the vehicle like the vehicle's trunk.20 9
Third, an important question is whether an arrestee needs to be within
reaching distance or immediate control of the area searched at the time of

201.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1969) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)); see also Glandon, supra note 175, at 1277-78.

202. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 753-54.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 763. When the suspect in Chimel was arrested as he walked into his house,
the area where he was arrested, that was within his immediate control, was the only place
officers could have conducted a SILA.
205. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459 (1981).
206. It does not matter if the person was in the vehicle or outside the vehicle as long
as the person was a recent occupant of the vehicle. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 617 (2004).
207. This is the reasoning of Belton that generally all passenger compartments are
within reaching distance or immediate control of the driver. See supra Part II.B.
208.
In Belton, the Court made the comparison from the facts of Chimel to a SILA
based on its rule for searching the passenger compartment of a vehicle:
Thus, while the Court in Chimel held that the police could not search all
the drawers in an arrestee's house simply because the police had arrested
him at home, the Court noted that drawers within an arrestee's reach
could be searched because of the danger their contents might pose to the
police.

Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
209. See id. at 461 n.4.
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the arrest or at the time of the search.2t ° The Court in Gant specifically held
that a SILA applies at the time of the search. 21 The prevailing practice of
law enforcement agencies before Gant's decision was to arrest vehicle occupants, handcuff them, place them in the back of a squad car, and then
perform a SILA.212 If the Court in Gant is correct, that the reaching distance
inquiry is at the time of the search rather than at the time of the arrest, then
the two rationales of Chimel would almost always be nonexistent.2 13 The
Court in Chimel was not specific as to whether it is at the time of the arrest
or at the time of the search, but some of the language in the opinion suggests that it is at the time of the arrest. 2 14 If it is at the time of the arrest,
then a Belton SILA would be valid. 2 5 After evaluating Chimel and distinguishing it from a SILA of a vehicle, there seems to be various distinctions
that call for a rule that alters Chimel to fit the current trends of the law, or to
simply overrule it and eliminate a SILA as an exception to the Fourth
Amendment.
B.

THE OTHER OPTIONS THE COURT SHOULD HAVE TAKEN

Looking at how a SILA first started and what it is today, the entire rule
of a SILA seems to be inconsistent and outdated. Chimel intended to make
a rule that would solve the inconsistency and confusion of the SILA decisions that preceded it, but its decision would lead to more inconsistent deciSee LaFave, supra note 155, § 7.1 (c) (arguing the significance of the time of the
210.
search and some earlier time).
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) ("[We] hold that the Chimel
211.
rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at
the time ofthe search." (emphasis added)).
212.
See Moskovitz, supra note 166, at 665-66.
213.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1730 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the area within an arrestee's
reach were assessed, not at the time of arrest, but at the time of the search, the Chimel rule
would rarely come into play."); see also LaFave, supranote 155, § 7. 1(c).
214.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) ("There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs
.... "). The Court in Chimel also stated, "But these justifications are absent where a search is
remote in time or place from the arrest." Id. at 764 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). Justice Alito in his dissenting opinion in Gant stated, "[U]nless the
Chimel rule was meant to be a specialty rule, applicable to only a few unusual cases, the
Court must have intended for this area to be measured at the time of the arrest." 129 S. Ct. at
1730 (Alito, J., dissenting).
215.
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) ("The search of the
respondent's jacket followed immediately upon that arrest. The jacket was located inside the
passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before
he was arrested.The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was 'within
the arrestee's immediate control' within the meaning of the Chimel case." (emphasis added)).
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sions that followed it. 21 6 Belton intended to make a rule that would solve the
inconsistency of decisions based on Chimel's rule, but its decision would
also lead to inconsistent decisions.217 Now, Gant makes a new rule that
intends to solve the inconsistency of decisions based on Belton's rule by
tying it back to Chimel.218 Will Gant's new two-part rule also lead to inconsistent decisions? For now, it is unclear, but the first option the Court
should have taken would have been simply to overrule Belton, Thornton,
and Chimel, and eliminate SILA as an exception to the Fourth Amendment
in its entirety. There are already rules in place for discovering evidence that
do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 21 9 Chimel's rule for having a SILA
does not make sense in today's society when officers secure arrestees before searching a vehicle for their own safety and for following sensible procedures.22 ° Overruling Belton and Chimel would eliminate the first part 22of
Gant's new rule and leave the second part as the only rule of its decision. 1
The "reason to believe" standard would limit the amount of searches for
people who are arrested for minor traffic offenses; however, leaving it as
the only rule may not be the best decision since there are several problems
with it.222 Eliminating a SILA as an exception to the Fourth Amendment
may also seem unnecessary because it has existed and been relied upon for
decades. There are, however, other options the Court should have taken.

216.
See supra Part IIA-B.
217.
See supra Part II.B-C.
218.
See supra Part III.A.
219.
For example, probable cause is a known exception to the Fourth Amendment.
See supra Part III.C. 1. The plain view doctrine is also a rule that can support a valid search.
See supra note 199. An inventory search may also support the discovery of evidence once a
vehicle is impounded. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (opening closed containers
during an inventory search of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth Amendment). Consent is
another effective means for searching a vehicle if the driver gives an officer consent to
search the vehicle. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991) ("Thus, we have long
approved consensual searches because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a
search once they have been permitted to do so." (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973))).
220.
See supra Part I11.C.2. Why have a rule that will rarely come into play when
officers secure an arrestee before performing a SILA? This is, of course, assuming the Gant
Court is correct that the reaching distance element is at the time of the search and not at the
time of arrest. See supra Part IV.A.
221.
This option would be endorsed by Justice Scalia based on his concurring opinion in Gant: "In my view we should simply abandon the Belton-Thornton charade of officer
safety and overrule those cases." Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1725 (2009) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia also stated, "No other Justice, however, shares my view that
application of Chimel in this context should be entirely abandoned." Id.
222.
See supra Part II.C. 1. Especially since there is probable cause, which is an
existing exception to the Fourth Amendment, and the "reason to believe" standard is somewhat similar.
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The Court should have upheld the Belton decision and validated the
search of Gant and of any individual, even though Gant was secured and
locked in the back of a squad car. This option would be following the doctrine of stare decisis and precedence from Thornton and the numerous decisions that followed Belton, 3 as well as the reliance on it by law enforcement agencies across the country.2 24 This option might be problematic with
motorists' privacy because it permits searches of vehicles when a driver
may have only committed a petty traffic offense.225 Upholding Belton alone
is not enough, but what if there was a way to uphold Belton yet limit it?
To limit the amount of searches for traffic offenses, the Court could
combine its "reason to believe" standard with the Belton rule. Instead of
Gant's two-part rule,226 the new rule could be that, "[after] a policeman has
made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as
a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile '227 as long as it is "reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.,228 This would limit unreasonable searches of people who commit minor traffic offenses by combining Gant's "reason to believe" standard with the Belton rule and how it is
interpreted. 229 The "reason to believe" standard, as a rule itself, would eliminate a STLA as an exception; however, combining it with Belton's rule
would keep a SILA as an exception. It can be argued that this resulting rule
does not follow Chimel for two reasons. First, Belton's broad interpretation
does not follow the twin rationales of Chimel.230 Second, the "reason to
believe" standard does not follow a SILA or the twin rationales of Chimel.23' The first point may be true, but Belton's rule was developed for

223.
This option would be endorsed by the dissenting opinions in Gant. Justice Breyer stated that "[t]he Belton rule has been followed not only by this Court in Thornton v.
United States, but also by numerous other courts. [Therefore,] [p]rinciples of stare decisis
must apply." Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1726 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
224.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.14 (1983) ("[T]he 'bright line'
that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search whenever officers effect a custodial
arrest.").
225.
See supra Part I11.A; see also Rudstein, supra note 120, at 1343.
226.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 ("Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the
offense of the arrest." (emphasis added)).
227.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
228.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723 (emphasis added).
229.
Gant's two-part rule was to limit Belton; this hypothetical rule would also do
just that. It would adopt Belton's broad reading in the first part but limit it with the second
part from the "reason to believe" standard.
230.
See supra Part I1I.A.
231.
See supra Part II1.B.2.
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adapting Chimel to a SILA of a vehicle. 32 There must be a rule that is for a
vehicle SILA because there are distinct differences between a vehicle and a
home, and as a result, differences in how a SILA would be conducted between the two. 2 33 Unlike Gant's rule, this hypothetical rule would not en-

danger an officer's safety for conducting a SILA. This hypothetical rule
would also assume that the reaching-distance rule takes place at the time of
the arrest and not at the time of the search, because at the time of arrest, the
passenger compartment is always within the reaching distance of a recent
occupant. 234 Officers should be permitted to secure arrestees before searching a vehicle for their safety when it is the prevailing practice among law
enforcement agencies, and it would be unreasonable for them not to do
so. 23 The second point is true that the "reason to believe" standard does not
follow a SILA or Chimel.236 Thus, it would be a new rule combined with
the old (Belton), to make a rule for a SILA that applies only to vehicles, so
as to adapt a SILA to today's society. It would be foolish to eliminate the
SILA exception when it has been around for decades, and foolish not to
change it or adjust it to meet present day society.237
V.

CONCLUSION

The SILA exception to the Fourth Amendment has had a shaky foundation over the-past century.238 In the past forty years alone, there have been
232.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.3 ("Our holding today does no more than determine
the meaning of Chimel's principles in this particular and problematic content."). The Court
must have meant that the particular and problematic content was applying Chimel's two
rationales in the vehicle context for a SILA. The Court also stated, "In order to establish the
workable rule this category of cases requires,we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the
area that may be searched in light of that generalization." Id. (emphasis added).
233.
See supra Part IV.A.
234.
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 ("The jacket was located inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested. The jacket was thus within the area which we have concluded was 'within the arrestee's immediate control' within the meaning of the Chimel case.").
See supra Part II1.C.2.
235.
See supra Part III.B.2.
236.
To meet the needs of present day society, courts must balance motorists' priva237.
cy interest and the government's interest in efficient police work. Lower courts and scholars
wanted Belton to be revisited since too many vehicles were searched when there was nothing
more than a traffic violation. See supra Part M.A. Law enforcement agencies across the
country relied on Belton's rule for the past twenty-eight years when conducting a SILA. See
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1726 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The new hypothetical
rule that combines Belton's rule with Gant's "reason to believe" standard would balance
both motorists' privacy interest and the government's interest by reducing the amount of
vehicle searches by changing the method for law enforcement agencies to perform a valid
SILA.
See supra Part II.A-C.
238.
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four Supreme Court decisions that have attempted to make a rule, or adapt a
previous rule, to clear up inconsistencies and lead to consistent decisions.
The problem is that in that span of forty years, there has been an increase in
the right to privacy, technology, and efficiency of the judicial process. Gant
is the most recent SILA decision to make a rule that would limit Belton, a
decision that has been relied upon for a SILA for the past twenty-eight
years, by protecting motorists from unreasonable searches guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. 239 Gant's two-part rule misses the mark and fails to
establish a rule that will clear up past inconsistent decisions and will undoubtedly lead to more inconsistent decisions. The problem starts with
Chimel because Chimel dealt with a SILA of a house, while Belton, Thornton, and Gant dealt with a SILA of a vehicle. Chimel was difficult to apply
in the automobile context, and justifying searches based on Chimel was
difficult because vehicles needed their own rule for a SILA. 2 40 Gant's new
two-part rule needs to be one rule that would combine its "reason to believe" standard with Belton's rule. This would limit the broad searches Belton proscribed, while retaining some reasoning for having a SILA. 241
Gant's decision took a different approach by establishing a two-part rule,
thus it will be interesting to see how future cases will apply Gant's new rule
and whether Gant's decision will need to be revisited in the future.
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